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Notes
Branding Neutral Explanations Pretextual
under Batson v. Kentucky: An
Examination of the Role of the Trial
Judge in Jury Selection
by
TRACY M.Y. CHOY
Famed defense attorney Clarence Darrow's jury selection
methods were keenly influenced by racial, sexual, and religious ste-
reotypes. He preferred Irishmen because he thought them to be
"emotional, kindly and sympathetic." He also liked "Unitarians,
Universalists, Congregationalists, Jews and other agnostics." But he
distrusted women, having "formed a fixed opinion that they were
absolutely dependable" and, therefore, unlikely to be sympathetic
to the defense.'
Introduction
In 1936, Darrow based his peremptory challenges on race and
gender biases, and his jury selection methods were considered consti-
tutionally acceptable by the United States Supreme Court. Today,
however, strikes based solely on race2 or gender3 are impermissible.
Since 1790,4 American trial attorneys had used peremptory challenges
to excuse jurors for any reason,5 without having to justify the dismis-
1. Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Clarence
Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, EsQuIRE MAG., May 1936, at 36, 37, 211, 212, reprinted
in LrrxG., Winter 1981, at 41, 43, 44).
2. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
3. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (extending Batson to pro-
hibit peremptory strikes based on gender).
4. See Eric N. Einhorn, Batson v. Kentucky and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B.: Is the
Peremptory Challenge Still Preeminent?, 36 B.C. L. REv. 161 (1994); Swain v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 202, 214 (1965) (citing 1 Stat. 119 (1790)).
5. See JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION: THE LAW, ART,
AND SCIENCE OF SELECTING A JURY 278 (2d ed. 1990).
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sals.6 Attorneys freely used peremptory challenges to exclude minor-
ity jurors, subject to no restrictions.
After nearly two centuries of unfettered abuse, the Supreme
Court ruled that allowing attorneys to dismiss jurors solely because of
their race was repugnant under the Constitution. In Batson v. Ken-
tucky,7 decided in 1986, the Court held that the exercise of racially-
motivated peremptory challenges violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 8 The Court established a
three-step, burden-shifting procedure to determine whether a per-
emptory challenge was race-based.9 Under this procedure, the chal-
lenging party is required first to make a prima facie showing that the
attorney purposefully discriminated in exercising a peremptory chal-
lenge to dismiss a potential juror.10 After the prima facie showing has
been made, the challenged party must articulate a race-neutral expla-
nation for dismissing the juror.' Finally, the trial court decides
whether the challenging party has carried its burden of proving inten-
tional discrimination.12
Many articles on the constitutionality of peremptory challenges
focus on Batson's three-step analysis and the Court's failure to give
lower courts specific guidelines for implementing the second and third
steps of Batson challenges.13 Recently, the Court provided guidelines
for Batson's second step, which requires the attorney who perempto-
rily dismissed a juror to provide a neutral explanation for the dismis-
sal. In Purkett v. Elem,'4 decided during the 1995 term, the Court held
that step two of the Batson inquiry only requires an explanation that is
facially valid, that is, free from overt discriminatory intent.15 The
Court further elaborated that trial courts that had demanded that the
facially neutral explanation be persuasive, or even plausible, were
combining Batson's second step, the neutral explanation requirement,
6. Swain, 380 U.S. at 220.
7. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
8. Id. at 89. See also Brian E. Leach, Extending Batson v. Kentucky to Gender and
Beyond: The Death Knellfor the Peremptory Challenge?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 381, 391 (1995).
Although Batson was decided on Fourteenth Amendment grounds, it has been held appli-
cable to federal courts by the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. See, eg., United
States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Batson applies to federal criminal prose-
cutions through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause.").
9. See David A. Sutphen, True Lies: The Role of Pretext Evidence Under Batson v.
Kentucky in the Wake of St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 94 MicH. L. REv. 488, 495
(1995).
10. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.
11. Id. at 97.
12. ld. at 98.
13. See, e.g., Gobert & Jordan, supra note 5, at 290 ("Unfortunately, the Batson Court
provided only limited guidance regarding the nature of the explanation required.").
14. 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam).
15. Id. at 1771.
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and the third step, the trial court's determination as to proof of pur-
poseful discrimination.16 Because the Court in Purkett only articu-
lated the requirements that an attorney must fulfill in order to meet
her burden at step two, questions remain regarding the third step of
the Batson inquiry. Trial courts need guidance in the determination of
whether an attorney's neutral explanation should be branded pretex-
tual in violation of the litigant or juror's equal protection rights.
Some authors have argued that heightened scrutiny at step one,
where the opponent of the strike is required to establish a prima facie
case that a peremptory challenge was exercised in a discriminatory
manner, would eliminate some of the problems encountered at step
three.17 If courts required attorneys to explain their challenges in
cases where there is a strong inference of purposeful discrimination,
courts might not feel compelled to accept flimsy explanations to rebut
relatively weak inferences of discrimination.'8 The integrity of the ju-
dicial system would undoubtedly benefit from an increased burden of
proof at the prima facie stage; judges would no longer be seen as un-
willing to eradicate racial discrimination by being easily satisfied with
any excuse proffered by an attorney to justify her use of a peremptory
challenge.19
This Note focuses on the final step of the Batson inquiry, the trial
court's factual determination of whether the proponent of the strike
has purposefully discriminated on the basis of race, however, because
the burdens at the prima facie stage and at the neutral explanation
stage are easily met. Step three is the most important stage of the
Batson proof structure because trial judges often skip over the prima
facie requirement 20 and focus their inquiry on the challenged attor-
ney's proffered neutral reasons. 21 Under Purkett, the persuasiveness
of the articulated neutral explanation is only relevant at Batson's final
stage.22 Thus, at step two, any facially non-racial explanation is suffi-
cient to successfully rebut the prima facie case. Clearly, Purkett has
lowered the challenged party's burden at step two by holding that any
plausible reason that is not overtly discriminatory will suffice.
16. Id.
17. See Stephen R. DiPrima, Note, Selecting a Jury in Federal Criminal Trials After
Batson and McCollum, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 888, 889-90 (1995) (arguing for a stronger
showing at stage one so judges would not have to accept weak explanations when showing
of intentional discrimination is slight).
18. Id. at 905.
19. Id. at 889.
20. Id. at 904.
21. See Sutphen, supra note 9, at 501.
22. See Lawrence D. Finder, Batson Examined for Race Neutral Reasons, 33 Hous-
TON LAW. 18, 18 (1995).
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The importance of the prima facie showing is diminished further
if the trial court proceeds "to the second step in the process, because
the issue of whether the defendant established a prima facie case of
the discriminatory use of a peremptory strike is moot."23 Step one
may be skipped if the trial judge neglects to require the attorney ob-
jecting to the use of a peremptory challenge to establish a prima facie
case. Frequently, the attorney defending her use of a peremptory
challenge waives her right to force opposing counsel to meet her bur-
den of a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination because many
attorneys quickly defend themselves when they are faced with an ac-
cusation of racism. When the attorney defends her use of perempto-
ries before the trial judge has ruled on step one, the inference of
discrimination becomes moot and may not be subject to appeal. Since
it is possible to reach step three without the trial court's ruling on step
one, this Note will focus on the relevant factors to be weighed in a
trial court's determination of whether the challenging attorney has
carried his or her burden of proving purposeful discrimination. The
Supreme Court recognized that Batson inquiries usually boil down to
the credibility of the proponent of the peremptory challenge's race-
neutral explanation.24 Thus, the outcomes of a significant number of
Batson challenges are based solely on whether the trial judge believes
that the proffered explanation is pretextual, and that race was the ac-
tual motivation for the strike.25
Under Batson, the challenging attorney often proves purposeful
discrimination by establishing that the challenged attorney's proffered
neutral explanation is pretextual.26 In other words, proof of pretext, a
showing that the proffered facially neutral explanation is merely con-
cealing the proponent of the strike's discriminatory intent, usually en-
titles the challenging party to "prevail as a matter of law."27 Thus,
under the Batson three-step proof structure, the critical question is:
When is a facially neutral explanation pretextual?
Some courts have identified relevant factors that should be con-
sidered in determining whether a challenged attorney's reasons for us-
23. State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11, 15 (Minn. 1995). Also, under Hernandez v. New
York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), if the challenged attorney defends the exercise of a peremptory
challenge before the attorney is required to by the trial court, the issue of whether the
challenging attorney made a proper prima facie showing of intentional discrimination is no
longer relevant. Id. at 359.
24. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365.
25. See Sutphen, supra note 9, at 501.
26. See Sutphen, supra note 9, at 489. Sutphen defines pretext, pretext evidence, and
proof of pretext as "the circumstance in which [the party] raising a Batson objection offers
evidence to prove or actually establishes that [the challenged attorney's] explanation for a
peremptory challenge, for whatever reason, is unworthy of credence." Id. at 490 n.12.
27. Id. at 490.
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ing peremptories are pretextual.28 This Note argues that all courts
should use these relevant factors in determining whether, under the
totality of the circumstances, the challenging party has proved pur-
poseful discrimination. Further, the use of these factors will ensure
that the trial judge makes a finding that is supported by the record.
The record is extremely important at the appellate court level because
the judge's findings of fact are entitled to great deference2 9 and will
not be disturbed unless there is clear error.30
Part I of this Note traces the history of the peremptory challenge
through Batson and its progeny. Part II focuses on Batson's three-
step analysis and demonstrates how Purkett clarified the proper stage
for the pretext analysis. Part III presents the advantages of the multi-
factor approach to the pretext analysis outlined above. In conclusion,
this Note will argue that it is appropriate for all trial courts to utilize a
multi-factor approach at Batson's third stage to ensure the equal pro-
tection of all litigants and potential jurors.
I. Peremptory Challenges: History
The history of the peremptory challenge spans over two hundred
years of English common law.31 Although peremptory challenges in
the United States "date[] as far back as the founding of the Repub-
lic[,] . . . no constitutional right to a peremptory challenge exists
..... 32 Peremptory challenges are guaranteed by statute in federal
and state jury trials.33 Historically, peremptory challenges did "not
have to be defended by an attorney or approved by a judge. '3 4 Thus,
they were often abused.35
In Swain v. Alabama,3 6 the Supreme Court first visited the issue
of a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges for discriminatory pur-
poses.3 7 The defendant in Swain was a black man accused of raping a
28. See, e.g., Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 622-24 (Ala. 1987) (listing factors rele-
vant to finding an inference of discrimination and the types of evidence tending to prove
pretext). See also infra note 149.
29. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 366 (1991).
30. See id. at 369.
31. See Herald Price Fahringer, The Peremptory Challenge: An Endangered Species?,
31 CRrm. L. BULL. 400, 401 (1995).
32. Id.
33. See Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses: Neutral Ex-
planations Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. Micu. J.L. REF. 229, 230 (1993).
34. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECrION PROCEDURES: OUR UNCERTAIN COMMIT-
MENT TO REPRESENTATIVE PANELS 145 (1977).
35. Id. at 147.
36. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
37. See Donald C. Hanratty, Jr., Note, Moving Closer to Eliminating Discrimination in
Jury Selection: A Challenge to the Peremptory, 7 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. 204,214 (1989).
young white woman.3 8 An all-white jury convicted him of the rape.3 9
Following the jury's guilty verdict, the Alabama circuit court sen-
tenced Robert Swain to death.40 Of the eight black men in the venire,
i.e., the panel of potential jurors from which a jury is selected 4 1 six
were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor.42 Despite this fact,
the Supreme Court held that the defendant failed to meet his burden
of proving that the prosecutor had systematically and deliberately ex-
cluded black jurors.43 Further, the Court "presumed that the prosecu-
tor's goal was the seating of a fair and impartial jury."44 The
challenging party could rebut this presumption only by showing that
the prosecutor consistently used "peremptory challenges to prevent
blacks from serving on a jury, 'whatever the circumstances, whatever
the crime, and whoever the defendant or the victim."' 45 While the
Swain Court recognized that a State's deliberate exercise of peremp-
tory challenges to discriminate against a potential black juror because
of his or her race violates the Equal Protection Clause, the Court re-
quired that a defendant prove purposeful discrimination over a series
of cases.46 Thus, to show systematic exclusion, a defendant could not
rely solely on the peremptory challenges exercised in the defendant's
individual case.47 Despite the unfairness of a nearly insurmountable
burden, Swain remained the law for over twenty years.
In Batson v. Kentucky,48 the Supreme Court sought to remove the
"crippling burden of proof"49 placed on defendants by Swain. Peti-
tioner in Batson, a black man, had been convicted by an all-white
Kentucky jury of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen
goods.50 Following a judge-conducted voir dire, the prosecutor exer-
cised his peremptory challenges to exclude all of the blacks on the
venire from serving on the jury.5' The Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely on
38. Swain, 380 U.S. at 231.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See Robert P. Arnold, Comment, Discrimination in Jury Selection Via Peremptory
Challenge: Many Are Called, But Few Are Chosen, 5 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 71, 73 (1984).
42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205.
43. Id. at 226.
44. GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 5, at 278.
45. Id. at 279 (citing Swain, 380 U.S. at 223). "The difficulty of rebuttal ... is reflected
by the facts of Swain: the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation despite the
undisputed fact that no black had served on a jury in Tallegada County in fifteen years."
Id.
46. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 203-04, 228.
47. Id. at 227-28.
48. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id. at 82-83.
51. Id. at 83.
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the basis of their race "or on the assumption that black jurors as a
group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a
black defendant" 52 violated the Equal Protection Clause.53
The Court adopted the burden-shifting proof structure used in
Title VII employment discrimination cases to determine whether the
prosecutor discriminated in selecting the jury.54 First, the defendant
must establish a prima facie case that the prosecutor purposefully dis-
criminated in peremptorily challenging certain jurors.5 5 Once the de-
fendant has made that prima facie showing, "the burden shifts to the
State to explain adequately the racial exclusion. '56 This second step
in the Batson framework requires the State to provide a race-neutral
reason for excluding the challenged juror.57 Finally, after the State
articulates a neutral explanation for its decision, the trial court deter-
mines whether the defendant has carried the burden of proving the
reason provided was pretextual58
Batson's holding only applied to criminal cases where the defend-
ant challenged the prosecutor's race-based exercise of peremptory
challenges on equal protection grounds.59 Since Batson, the Supreme
Court has extended Batson principles to criminal cases where the de-
fendant and the excluded juror do not share the same race,60 to civil
cases,61 to peremptory challenges exercised by criminal defendants,62
and to gender-based peremptory challenges.63 Thus, every litigant in
every jury trial has the right to bring a Batson challenge against an
attorney's exercise of peremptory challenges based on either race or
gender.
52. Id. at 89.
53. Id.
54. See id at 94 n.18; see also Sutphen, supra note 9, at 490.
55. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94.
56. Id. at 94.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 96.
59. Sutphen, supra note 9, at 489 n.11.
60. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding Batson applicable in criminal
cases regardless of whether the defendant and the excluded juror were of the same race).
61. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991) (extending Batson
to civil cases).
62. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
63. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex reL T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1421 (1994). Although Batson
now applies in all cases to every litigant for both race and gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges, this Note will focus on the traditional Batson situation. Thus, "the prosecutor" or
"the State" may be read interchangeably with "the challenged attorney," while "the de-
fendant" may be read as "the challenging party." Furthermore, assertions based on ra-
cially-motivated strikes likewise apply to gender-based discrimination.
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U.. Batson's Three-Step Analysis
Batson's burden-shifting framework is comprised of three steps.
The challenging party acts at step one, the challenged attorney acts at
step two, and the judge acts at step-three. In practice, however, thejudge plays a role at every step, and both the challenging and chal-
lenged attorneys may need to act further at step three. Furthermore,
as discussed in this section, each step may contain other components.
A. Establishing a Prima Fade Case
The challenging party must establish a prima facie case 64 to raise
an inference of purposeful discrimination. Under a Batson analysis,
the prima facie case requires that the challenging party first show that
he or she is a member of a protected group and that the prosecutor
has exercised peremptory challenges to remove jurors of that group.65
Second, the challenging party is entitled to rely on the fact, about
which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute ajury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a
mind to discriminate. '66 Finally, the challenging party must show that
these facts, as well as any other relevant circumstance, raise an infer-
ence that the challenged attorney used peremptory challenges to ex-
clude jurors from the venire on account of their race67 or gender.68
As mentioned earlier, during step one of the Batson inquiry, the
trial court should consider any relevant circumstance in determining
whether the challenging party has established a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. 69 The Supreme Court has noted that a
prosecutor's pattern of using strikes against black jurors is a relevant
circumstance that may raise an inference of discriminatory purpose.70
The Court, however, did not provide further guidance in this area and
instead stated: "We have confidence that trial judges, experienced in
supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances con-
64. The prima facie case may be established "solely on evidence concerning the prose-
cutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial." Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
65. Id. Cases decided after Batson have removed the requirement that the challeng-
ing party and stricken juror share the same race. After Powers v. Ohio, corporations,
which have neither race nor gender, have standing to bring Batson challenges. William C.
Slusser et al., Batson, J.E.B., and Purkett: A Step by Step by Step Guide to Making and
Challenging Peremptory Challenges in Federal Court, 37 S. TEx. L.J. 127, 131 (1996).
66. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
67. Id.
68. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1429-30 (1994).
69. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
70. Id.
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cerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima
facie case of discrimination against black jurors."71
Whether trial courts properly apply the above three factors, espe-
cially the factor incorporating any relevant circumstances, in deter-
mining prima facie cases in Batson challenges has been debated.72
One author has argued that judges often do not require the showing
of a prima facie case at all or that they accept very weak inferences of
discrimination.73 Another problem results when attorneys defend
challenges to their use of peremptories before the trial court has ruled
on the prima facie issue.74 Once a challenged peremptory strike is
defended, the challenging party is deemed to have raised an inference
of purposeful discrimination.75 Although it may seem odd that an at-
torney would prematurely defend her peremptory challenge, and
thereby raise the inference of intentional discrimination, many attor-
neys have a natural tendency to react quickly to an accusation of ra-
cism or gender discrimination by defending their strikes before the
judge requires them to justify the dismissals.
In both federal and state courts, some judges skip over the prima
facie stage entirely and immediately demand an explanation from the
proponent of the strike.76 One theory suggests that judges have
equated proof of pretext with intentional discrimination to such a
large extent that they attempt to expedite the process by "ask[ing]
prosecutors to offer a race-neutral explanation for their challenges
even before a prima facie case is established." 77 Because some judges
hastily deal, or do not deal at all, with prima facie evidence of inten-
tional discrimination, practitioners' guides emphasize the importance
of challenging parties' waiting for or insisting on a ruling from the
judge on the prima facie issue before providing a race-neutral expla-
nation for their strikes.78 Practitioners are reminded to establish a
clear record to ensure that none of their actions or inactions result in a
waiver of rights on appeal.79
A few courts have identified elaborate factors that should be
taken into account in considering all of the relevant circumstances
bearing on the prima facie issue. In 1987, the Alabama Supreme
71. Id.
72. See generally DiPrima, supra note 17; Sutphen, supra note 9.
73. DiPrima, supra note 17, at 890 (proposing that "judges use statistical decision the-
ory to analyze the numeric evidence of discrimination at the prima facie stage").
74. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
76. Sutphen, supra note 9, at 501 (citing Jeffrey S. Brand, The Supreme Court, Equal
Protection and Jury Selection: Denying that Race Still Matters, 1994 Wis. L. Rlv. 511, 583
n.380 (listing circuit court cases that have skipped Batson's prima facie stage)).
77. Sutphen, supra note 9, at 501.
78. Slusser et al., supra note 65, at 144.
79. See id. at 137-38.
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Court provided its trial and appellate courts with an exhaustive list of
the types of evidence that may raise the inference of discrimination. 0
The types of evidence included: (1) statistics showing that race is the
only common characteristic amongst the excluded jurors; (2) "[a] pat-
tern of strikes against black jurors on the particular venire;" (3) "[t]he
past conduct of the state's attorney;" (4) "[t]he type and manner of
the state's attorney's questions and statements;" (5) "[t]he type and
manner of questions directed to the challenged juror, including a lack
of questions, or a lack of meaningful questions;" (6) "[d]isparate treat-
ment of the jury venire with the same characteristics, or who answer a
question in the same or similar manner;" (7) "[d]isparate examination
of members of the venire;" (8) disparate impact statistics that demon-
strate that most of the challenges were used to strike blacks from thejury; and (9) the state's use of peremptory challenges to remove all or
most black jurors.81
The factor approach at the prima facie stage has many of the
same advantages as a factor approach at the pretext analysis discussed
in Part III. Employing a factor approach to analyze the challenging
party's prima facie basis for believing purposeful discrimination re-
minds the judge that sufficient evidence is required to raise an infer-
ence of discrimination. Challenges that fail to demonstrate a prima
facie level of discrimintion should be rejected in order to preserve the
time-honored tradition of peremptory challenges, as well as the integ-
rity of the jury selection process.
Respecting the history and purpose of the peremptory strike ne-
cessitates that challenges that do not raise a sufficient inference of dis-
crimination be dismissed for failure to make out a prima facie claim.
Likewise, if an explanation is required in instances where an inference
is slight, the acceptance of a weak explanation to rebut a weak infer-
ence only harms the judicial system and its commitment to eliminating
racial and gender discrimination in the jury selection process.82
Whether or not a trial court uses the types of factors employed by the
Alabama Supreme Court, once the judge finds that the challenging
80. Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 622-23 (Ala. 1987).
81. Id. The court also provided examples of these types of evidence: (1) "'[I]t may be
significant that the persons challenged, although all black, include both men and women
and are a variety of ages, occupations and social or economic conditions,' . . . indicating
that race was the deciding factor;" (2) "4 of 6 peremptory challenges used to strike blackjurors;" (6) "[In Slappy, a black elementary school teacher was struck as being potentially
too liberal because of his job, but a white elementary school teacher was not challenged;"
and (7) "[In Slappy, a question designed to provoke a certain response that is likely to
disqualify a juror was asked to black jurors, but not to white jurors." Id. (citing Slappy v.
State, 503 So. 2d 350, 354-55 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)).
82. See DiPrima, supra note 17, at 889.
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party has failed to establish a prima facie case, the Batson inquiry
ends.83
B. Facially Neutral Explanations
Once the trial court finds that the challenging party has estab-
lished a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production
shifts to the challenged attorney to rebut the prima facie claim.8 4
Although the Batson Court failed to give specific guidelines regarding
what is required at this stage, the Court noted that the neutral expla-
nation "need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for
cause."'8 5 The Court also ruled that the prosecutor is precluded from
rebutting the defendant's prima facie claim "by stating merely that he
challenged jurors of the defendant's race on the assumption-or his
intuitive judgment-that they would be partial to the defendant be-
cause of their shared race."'86 The prosecutor is also barred from re-
butting an inference of discrimination merely by denying that he had a
discriminatory motive or by affirming his good faith.87
Recently, in Purkett v. Elem,88 the Supreme Court ended the con-
troversy surrounding what was meant by Batson's requirement of a
"neutral explanation." Respondent in Purkett, a black male,8 9 was
convicted of second-degree robbery in Missouri. 90 During voir dire,
his counsel made Batson objections to the prosecutor's peremptory
challenges against two black males.91 The victim was a black woman,
and the prosecutor did not strike the only black female from the ve-
nire.92 The prosecutor explained that he struck the black male jurors
because they were "the only two people on the jury ... with facial
hair.... And I [did]n't like the way they looked, with the way the hair
is cut, both of them. And the mustaches and the beards look[ed] sus-
picious to me."93 The court overruled Respondent's objection without
explanation; the appellate court affirmed that decision.94 Respondent
83. DiPrima, supra note 17, at 904 ("Yet the consequence of a finding that a prima
facie case has not been established is that the judge refuses to ask the challenged party for
an explanation, despite the possibility that the challenged party will offer an explanation
that reveals discriminatory intent.").
84. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 5, at 290.
85. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 98.
88. Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769 (1995) (per curiam).
89. Donald A. Dripps, "IDidn't Like the Way He Looked," TRIAL, July 1995, at 94, 96
(citing State v. Elem, 747 S.W.2d 772 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)).
90. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
91. Id.
92. Dripps, supra note 89, at 94, 96.
93. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
94. Id.
then filed a petition for habeas corpus, and the district court denied
his claim.95 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and re-
manded.96 Finding the prosecutor's proffered explanation pretextual,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the trial court committed clear error
by not finding intentional discrimination.97 The Eighth Circuit, in-
structing the district court to grant the habeas corpus writ, stated that
the prosecutor must "at least articulate some plausible race-neutral
reason for believing that [the] factors [given] will somehow affect the
person's ability to perform his or her duties as a juror."98
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the prosecutor had
met his burden of rebutting the defendant's prima facie case because
the proffered explanation was race-neutral. 99 The Court found that
the Eighth Circuit improperly combined Batson's second and third
steps by requiring a persuasive or plausible explanation. 100 Noting
that the persuasiveness of the justification only becomes relevant at
the third step, the Court stated that "the ultimate burden of persua-
sion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the
opponent of the strike."'101 In response to the dissent's claim that the
majority was overruling Batson's mandate that neutral explanations
be related to the case at issue,' 02 the majority simply stated that what
is meant "by a 'legitimate reason' is not a reason that makes sense, but
a reason that does not deny equal protection.' 0 3
All that is required at Batson's second step is an explanation that
is facially valid; the literal meaning of the words used in the chal-
lenged party's explanation must be free from discriminatory intent. °4
Many authors, siding with the dissent, have claimed that Purkett
makes it more difficult for challenging parties to prevail on Batson
grounds. 05 However, this view overlooks the fact that the majority's
ruling only gets the challenged attorney past Batson's second step.
The persuasiveness of the justification is extremely important at Bat-
son's third step, where "implausible or fantastic justifications may
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1770.
98. Id. (quoting Elem v. Purkett, 25 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 1994)).
99. Id. at 1771.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2748-49 (1993)).
102. Id. at 1772 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 1771.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Dripps, supra note 89, at 96 ("If 'I didn't like the way he looked' is an
acceptable race-neutral justification for peremptories, only a very stupid prosecutor will
ever again lose a Batson claim."); Fahringer, supra note 31, at 410 ("This decision is a
major disappointment to those who defend criminal cases and will inevitably reduce Bat-
son claims.").
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(and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimina-
tion."'1 6 Thus, explanations like "I didn't like the way he looked"
may still be found pretextual as a matter of law under Batson's third
step. Purkett only alters the law in the limited sense of requiring that
judges make the determination that the proffered explanation is
pretextual at the third step of the inquiry.
Of course, if the challenged attorney's explanation violates the
Equal Protection Clause and is discriminatory on its face, the trial
court does not proceed to step three. For example, if the attorney
admits that she dismissed a black juror solely because the juror is
black, the inquiry ends at step two. Here, step three is rendered un-
necessary since, under Batson, peremptory challenges based on race
violate the juror's equal protection rights. On the other hand, if the
attorney states a facially nondiscriminatory explanation for dismissing
the juror, that neutral explanation must be examined for pretext at
step three. For instance, if the attorney claims that she dismissed the
juror because the juror is uneducated, the trial judge must proceed to
step three to determine whether other jurors who are also uneducated
were similarly dismissed and if there are other relevant circumstances
that have the tendency to show pretext.
C. Batson's Final Step
At Batson's final step, the trial court must decide whether the
challenging party carried its burden of proving purposeful discrimina-
tion. Since Purkett explained exactly what a neutral explanation must
contain to be sufficient, step three remains the only Batson step that
the Supreme Court has provided absolutely no guidance for a trial
court's determination of purposeful discrimination. The Court has de-
fined Batson's third step interchangeably as: (1) the trial court's duty
to determine whether the opponent to the strike has established pur-
poseful discrimination, 0 7 and (2) the step where the court must de-
cide whether the proffered explanation is pretextual.'08 In other
words, if the opponent to the strike can convince the judge that the
proffered reasons are pretextual, the opponent will be deemed to have
proven purposeful discrimination as a matter of law.'0 9 Thus, the criti-
cal question at stage three is: When should a facially neutral explana-
tion be branded pretextual?"o
106. Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1771.
107. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (1986).
108. See Purkett, 115 S. Ct. at 1772 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at
96-98).
109. Sutphen, supra note 9, at 500.
110. People v. Richie, 635 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Recently, in People v. Richie,"' the appellate division of the
Supreme Court of New York squarely ruled on this issue. The court
held that the determination of whether an explanation is pretextual
depends on a variety of factors, including: (1) "[w]hether the reason
proffered by the party exercising the peremptory challenge relates at
all to the facts of the case;" (2) "[t]he extent to which the party exer-
cising the peremptory challenge actually questioned the proposed ju-
ror;" (3) "[w]hether particular questions were asked of only one group
of jurors, and not of others;" (4) "[w]hether a particular reason was
applied to only one group of jurors, and not to others;" or (5)
"[w]hether the reason proffered was based upon 'hard data' or was
purely intuitive. '112
The Richie multi-factor approach gives trial courts the essential
guidelines needed to effectuate Batson's mandate of eradicating invid-
ious racial discrimination in jury selection. Richie's first factor re-
quires that the articulated neutral explanation be related to the facts
of the instant case, reinstating a key element of Batson. Originally,
Batson required that a legitimate race-neutral explanation must be
reasonably specific and related to the case at hand.113 However,
under Purkett, any facially valid explanation free from overt discrimi-
natory intent satisfies the neutral explanation requirement." 4 Requir-
ing that a neutral explanation be related to the current case in the
pretext analysis of Batson's third stage addresses the concerns of the
Purkett dissent while remaining within the framework established by
the majority.
Further, minorities are increasingly struck based on their appear-
ance, their place of residence, or their social relationships, without a
showing that any of these reasons are related to the current case.11 5
Requiring judges to verify that the proffered explanation is relevant to
the case to be tried ensures the active judicial role envisioned by the
Batson Court at the final stage of the inquiry." 6 Judges need to distin-
guish between legitimate reasons that may be valid in one case, but
invalid in another. For instance, if an attorney justifies her strike by
asserting that because the stricken juror lives in a low income, pre-
dominately black neighborhood, the attorney believes that the juror
111. Id.
112. Id. at 266-67.
113. Batson, 476 U.S. 79, 97-98 & n.20.
114. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
115. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 33, at 274.
116. See Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson's Invidious Legacy: Discriminatory Juror Ex-
clusion and the "Intuitive" Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336, 365 (1993)
(advocating the elimination of subjective neutral explanations and the acceptance of objec-
tive explanations only if a substantial nexus is established between the explanation and the
case to be tried).
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may have a negative attitude toward law enforcement, the judge
should hold this reason pretextual when it is unrelated to the facts of
the case.117 On the other hand, residence in the same neighborhood
as the defendant or the crime scene should not be branded pretextual
when such reason is substantially relevant to the case.118
Attorneys who cannot articulate a specific case-relevant reason
for peremptorily challenging certain jurors must be forced to empanel
those jurors." 9 Moreover, in the search for justification for a strike,
attorneys necessarily will be compelled to confront their own subcon-
scious assumptions about race. 20
Richie's second factor, the extent to which the proponent of a
strike asked questions of the stricken juror, is significant because a
lack of meaningful questioning often masks discriminatory motives. 12'
Cursory questioning of minority jurors may be an attempt to ensure
that a common trait among the jurors does not surface as proof that
the attorney's strike was racially motivated.'2 Further, the extent to
which a potential juror is questioned before being stricken may mask
discriminatory motives when an attorney claims to have dismissed ajuror because the juror belongs to a group not identified by race which
may render the juror more likely to be biased against her case.123
Limited questioning often indicates pretext because, for example, it is
easier for an attorney to assert that she is excusing a teacher because
she believes that teachers are too liberal,124 than for the attorney to
establish that the juror actually possesses liberal views. In this situa-
tion, attorneys who do not take the opportunity to sufficiently ex-
amine jurors to determine whether they maintain the undesired views
associated with their profession should be held suspect during pretext
determination. 125
Disparate questioning, Richie's third factor, tends to indicate pre-
text because it suggests that the attorney is asking different questions
to elicit the different answers needed to justify a peremptory strike. 26
When different questions are asked of different groups of jurors, there
is a strong indication that the attorney has begun a fishing expedition
117. See id. at 364-65.
118. See id. at 365.
119. Id.
120. Id. (arguing that attorneys will have to ask themselves and answer the question:
"'Why am I striking this juror?"').
121. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 33, at 270-72.
122. Id.
123. See i at 272.
124. See id. at 244.
125. See id.
126. See Sutphen, supra note 9, at 500 (listing "[d]isparate examination of members of
the venire, i.e., questioning a challenged juror so as to evoke a certain response without
asking the same question of other panel members" as a factor tending to prove pretext).
in search of any reason to excuse the juror.127 In other words, if an
attorney bases a strike on the answer elicited from a question that was
not asked of all potential jurors, the basis of the strike is most likely
pretextual.128 If the attorney had found the basis to be so significant,
she would have asked the same question of every juror.129 For exam-
ple, if a juror's potential fluency in Spanish is important enough to be
the basis for the juror's exclusion, every juror should be examined for
his or her fluency in Spanish because it is possible that non-Latinos
may also be proficient in the Spanish language. 30 In addition, it
would be difficult for an attorney to claim that the proffered basis was
related to the facts of the case if she did not evenly examine each
juror.13 1
Richie's fourth factor alerts the court and parties to keep in mind
the traits of the empaneled jurors as well as to keep an eye out for the
traits of jurors who have yet to be empaneled. In making its factual
determination of whether intentional discrimination has been proven,
the court must take into account whether a proffered explanation is
applied to one group of jurors and not to another. Richie's third and
fourth factors are closely linked. While the third factor focuses on
uneven examination, the fourth factor focuses on uneven application.
Although the Richie court stated that uniformity is not required, since
uneven application may have non-discriminatory, legitimate rea-
sons,132 uneven application requires scrutiny because it may indicate
that discrimination was more likely than not the rationale behind the
strike. An example of uneven application is the peremptory challenge
of a sixty-five year-old minority juror for being too old, after a seventy
year-old white juror had already been empaneled.
One author has suggested that attorneys be held to a standard of
"comparability" when exercising their peremptory challenges. 33 The
comparability theory requires that once an attorney peremptorily
challenges a juror for possessing a certain trait, all other jurors who
share the same trait must be similarly excluded.134 Thus, an attorney
aware of the comparability requirement must weigh the consequences
of having "to seat one unfavorable juror... [against having] to ex-
clude several favorable jurors.' 35
127. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 33, at 270.
128. See Swift, supra note 116, at 367.
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id.
132. Richie, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
133. See Swift, supra note 116, at 365-66.
134. See id. at 366.
135. Id.
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Richie's final factor considers the extent to which the articulated
reason relies on objectively verifiable data.136 Objective data is some-
times referred to as "hard data" and encompasses any written or oral
answers a juror gives to jury questionnaires and voir dire.137 Hard
data also includes any subjective data, such as a juror's body language,
that can be verified by the judge.138 An example of subjective hard
data includes inattentiveness on the part of a juror who constantly
looks at her watch during questioning, which is actually observed by
the judge. 139 Challenges based solely on hard data may rely only on
specific facts within the trial judge's actual knowledge.' 40 Because
challenges based on hard data can be verified by the judge, they are
the easiest types of evidence for judges to analyze as possible misuses
of peremptories.
It is essential that an attorney's reliance on soft data, as opposed
to hard data, be scrutinized, because exclusive reliance on soft data
easily masks racial discrimination.' 4 ' Soft data challenges are based
on reasons that may include intuition or race-related traits, as well as
unverifiable courtroom demeanor. 42 Soft data explanations for chal-
lenges are frequently criticized because their subjective nature renders
them impossible to be analyzed or verified by a judge.'43 An example
of unimpeachable soft data exclusion includes a juror dismissed for
failing to maintain eye-contact with an attorney where that failure
cannot be confirmed by the judge.'"4 Challenges based on soft data
reasons must be highly scrutinized because they often "mask overt
and covert discrimination."'145 Courts that accept soft data-based dis-
missals allow attorneys the wriggle room they need to craft neutral
explanations allowing them to dismiss jurors in bad faith. Finally, by
accepting soft data explanations, a court sends the message that it "is
not serious about its commitment to the eradication of racism from
the courtroom."'1 46
136. See id at 337 (defining "hard data" as explanations based on objectively verifiable
information supplied by the juror).
137. See id. at 363.
138. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 33, at 269.
139. See id. (explaining that an acceptable and verifiable, subjective explanation could
be a decision to exclude a juror because she fell asleep during voir dire if the trial judge
makes a record of the juror's behavior).
140. See Swift, supra note 116, at 364.
141. See id. at 361.
142. See id. at 359.
143. See id. at 362.
144. See id. at 338 (including "body language, dress, hairstyle, speech dialect or tone of
voice" as well as "an attorney's 'intuition"' in his definition of soft data).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 363.
In addition to the New York Supreme Court Appellate Division's
decision in Richie, the Alabama Supreme Court,147 the Texas Criminal
Appellate Court,148 and the Florida District Court of Appeals149 have
employed multi-factor approaches to determining pretext at Batson's
final step. These cases signify that courts are still struggling with the
type of standards that should apply at step three of their Batson analy-
ses. The Richie court and other courts' 50 employing a similar mul-
tifactor approach have incorporated flexibility into their analyses of
the various factors indicating pretext. Based on a list of factors rele-
vant to finding pretext, which is similar to the list from Richie, one
author remarked, "under the Batson proof structure, if the defendant
is successful in proving pretext by establishing one of these factors, he
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."' 5'
The Richie court attempted to take the pretextual analysis one
step further by categorizing certain factors as presumptively pretex-
tual and other factors as presumptively nonpretextual.152 For exam-
ple, a proffered explanation based on a juror's employment or
profession should be considered presumptively pretextual if it is unre-
lated to the facts of the case. 53 However, an explanation premised on
the fact that the juror had previously been the victim of a crime should
147. See, for example, Ex parte Branch, 526 So. 2d 609, 624 (Ala. 1987), which sets
forth the types of evidence that can be used to show pretext:
1. The reasons given [by the challenged attorney] are not related to the facts of
the case.
2. There was a lack of questioning to the challenged juror, or a lack of meaning-
ful questions.
3. Disparate treatment-persons with the same or similar characteristics as the
challenged juror were not struck.
4. Disparate examination of members of the venire; e.g., a question designed to
provoke a certain response that is likely to disqualify the juror was asked to black
jurors, but not to white jurors.
5. The prosecutor, having 6 peremptory challenges, used 2 to remove the only 2
blacks remaining on the venire.
6. "[A]n explanation based on a group bias where the group trait is not shown
to apply to the challenged juror specifically." For instance, an assumption that
teachers as a class are too liberal, without any specific questions having been di-
rected to the panel or the individual juror showing the potentially liberal nature
of the challenged juror.
(citations omitted).
148. Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) (listing the same
factors as Ex parte Branch with the exception of number five).
149. Slappy v. State, 503 So. 2d 350, 355 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (citing the same
factors as Keeton).
150. See generally State v. Gill, 460 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Nunn,
652 N.E.2d 1146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); State v. Gaitan, 536 N.W.2d 11 (Minn. 1995).
151. Sutphen, supra note 9, at 500.
152. See People v. Richie, 635 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
153. See id.
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be considered presumptively nonpretextual.154 In addition, the court
found that proffered explanations based on a juror's familial relation-
ship to a corrections officer or prior jury service are not facially
pretextual.155 Noting the riskiness of these types of categorizations,
the Richie court ruled that the categories were useful, but not determi-
native, and it subjected them to rebuttable presumptions of pretext or
nonpretext 5 6 In addition, the court noted that the uneven applica-
tion of certain factors does not necessarily render those factors pretex-
tual.157 The court relied on the fact that incomplete uniformity "of
neutral factors may not always indicate pretext, [ ] but simply an in-
complete understanding of the full reasons for the prosecutor's deci-
sion to seat some jurors while challenging others."' 58
Further, in South Carolina v. Gill, 59 the South Carolina Court of
Appeals found that when a challenged attorney offers more than one
reason for striking a juror, the fact that one reason may be pretextual
does not amount to a Batson violation as a matter of law.160 Since the
trial court's determination at step three must be based on the totality
of the relevant circumstances, the Gill court held that one pretextual
reason among other nonpretextual reasons will not constitute a per se
Batson violation unless the invalid reason is deemed the controlling
reason for the strike.16'
Given that the Supreme Court has never indicated the standards
a trial court should use in determining when a challenging party has
proven purposeful discrimination, some courts have established lists
of relevant factors to be weighed in determining whether a proffered
explanation is pretextual. Many of these factors echo the relevant cir-
cumstances considered in the determination of whether the opponent
to the strike has established an inference of discrimination at the
prima facie stage. 62
HI. Adopting the Richie Approach
This Note recommends that trial courts adopt the Richie ap-
proach for Batson's step three determination of whether a neutral ex-
154. See id
155. See id. at 267.
156. Id. ("There may be cases in which crime-victim status is properly found to have
been used as a pretext and there may be other cases in which employment status is prop-
erly found to have been used legitimately as an explanation for a peremptory strike.")
(citation omitted).
157. See id. (citing People v. Allen, 629 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. 1995)).
158. Allen, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
159. 460 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).
160. See id. at 416.
161. See id. at 417.
162. See, eg., Allen, 629 N.Y.S.2d at 1008.
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planation is pretextual. This approach allows courts to make Batson
rulings that ensure the equal protection of both the challenging
party163 and the excluded juror,164 while preserving the integrity of the
judicial system.165
The Richie approach, listing the various factors that a trial court
should consider when ruling on whether an explanation is pretextual,
is advantageous because it gives trial courts guidance in determining
whether there is intentional race or gender discrimination in an attor-
ney's use of peremptory challenges. The list of relevant factors high-
lights what the Richie court found important in analyzing possible
racially-motivated peremptory challenges and warns trial courts about
the types of factors that appellate courts will review on appeal.
With a relevant factor approach, regardless of whether the trial
court finds the explanation pretextual or nonpretextual, the court will
be able to bolster its ruling by pointing to the factors that led to its
determination. Judges will need to make a specific finding of these
factors on the record. Thus, a better record will be established in case
of an appeal. A better record is also generated when a trial court is
forced to explain why it did not find pretext despite evidence of the
uneven application of a certain factor. Likewise, this Note proposes
that when the court is required to show why a presumptively pretex-
tual explanation, such as one based on employment, is found not to be
pretextual, or when a presumptively nonpretextual explanation, such
as one based on a juror's familial relationship to one of the attorneys,
is found to be pretextual, the court will produce a better record and
will be required to justify its conclusions.
Consideration of the various factors relevant to determining pre-
text is also advantageous because it provides for flexibility in trial
court decision-making. Each of the relevant factors tends to indicate
pretext. For example, if the explanation is not related to the facts of
the case, it is likely that the explanation is merely an excuse used to
mask a discriminatory purpose.166 However, while failure to meet the
standard of one of the factors creates a presumption of pretext, that
presumption is rebuttable. 167 The factors are not hard and fast rules.
They are simply intended to give trial courts guidance. The Richie
court realized the risks involved in categorizing certain factors as
163. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986).
164. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 412-14 (1991).
165. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
166. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 33, at 273 ("[A]n explanation with an un-
usually attenuated connection to the case at bar justifies the court in concluding that the
prosecutor has likely invented a post hoc rationale for a race-based strike.").
167. See People v. Richie, 635 N.Y.S.2d 263, 266 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (emphasizing
that presumptively pretextual or nonpretextual categories are helpful, but not
determinative).
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either presumptively pretextual or presumptively nonpretextual. 168 In
response, the court stated, "[w]hile we recognize that the lack of clear-
cut rules in the area may lead to disparate results, the necessity of
determining whether a peremptory challenge is pretextual requires
that we employ such methodology as results in a seemingly fair
resolution."' 69
On appeal, a complete record of a Batson hearing is essential be-
cause the standard of review for the trial court's finding on the issue of
purposeful discrimination is one of great deference. 170 Since the de-
termination of pretext is a factual finding that depends on the trial
court's evaluation of credibility, the trial court's findings are entitled
to a presumption of correctness' 7' and will not be upset unless they
are found to be clearly erroneous. 172 In situations in which an expla-
nation is based on evidence not reflected in the record, such as the
juror's appearance or demeanor during questioning, it is appropriate
for reviewing courts to give a trial court's finding great deference. 73
However, where an explanation is based on a juror's background or
profession that is established on the record, the trial court's findings
should be reviewed against the factors used to find pretext, since
many of the credibility issues unique to the trial court would be
eliminated.
Another advantage of the Richie factor approach is that it dispels
the fear that Batson challenges have been reduced to nothing in the
wake of Purkett. Whether a facially neutral explanation should be
branded pretextual is a serious question to be determined at Batson's
third step. In People v. Jones, 74 the Appellate Division of the New
York Supreme Court found that an attorney's challenges based on a
juror's employment status, residence, and marital status were pretex-
tual.175 The Jones court noted that, although these factors are race-
neutral and may be used to properly exclude jurors in certain cases,
these "factors must somehow be related to the factual circumstances
of the case and the qualifications of the juror to serve on that case.' 76
Thus, use of a factor approach to pretext rebuts the argument that
168. Id. (The risk involved the fear that "as these categories proliferate, Batson juris-
prudence [may] become unacceptably complex and cumbersome. We emphasize that,
while such categories may be useful, they [will not be] determinative.").
169. Id. at 267.
170. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364 (1991).
171. See id. at 365.
172. See id. at 366-67.
173. See Richie, 635 N.Y.S,2d at 266.
174. 636 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
175. See id. at 117.
176. Id. (citing People v. Richie, 635 N.Y.S.2d 263 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)); see also
Purkett v. Elem, 114 S. Ct. 1769 (1995).
Purkett makes it easier for attorneys to get away with race and gen-
der-based peremptory challenges.
Conclusion
Research shows that racially-motivated peremptory challenges
frequently occur despite Batson's mandates.1 77 Many trial courts re-
frain from finding a prosecutor's neutral explanation pretextual de-
spite the fact that many proffered explanations are based on age,
occupation, unemployment, religion, demeanor, relationship with a
trial participant, lack of intelligence, socioeconomic status, residence,
marital status, previous involvement with the criminal justice system,
or jury experience. 178 When they are unrelated to the case at hand,
many of these "neutral explanations" "permit a lawyer to discriminate
against both the opposing party and the venire person." 79 An ap-
proach that lists the factors relevant to finding pretext utilizes Bat-
son's third step to eliminate purposeful discrimination in jury
selection. By categorizing the above factors as presumptively pretex-
tual when they are unrelated to the facts of the case, the trial court
makes it much more difficult for challenged attorneys to discriminate
against potential jurors on the basis of their race or gender. 80
Trial courts employing a relevant factor approach will make bet-
ter determinations of purposeful discrimination by keeping the vari-
ous factors in mind and will create a better record for appellate
review. Adoption of the Richie approach is a solution to race-based
peremptory challenges within the Batson framework. The advantages
of the factor approach provide an alternative to suggestions that per-
emptory challenges be either eliminated entirely' 8' or reduced in
number. 82
177. See Raphael & Ungvarsky, supra note 33, at 274.
178. See id.
179. See Swift, supra note 116, at 338.
180. See id. at 365 (concluding that requiring that a neutral explanation be related to
the specific facts of the case necessitates "active judicial supervision of the lawyer's per-
emptory challenges and therefore effectively limits a lawyer's opportunities for improper
discrimination").
181. See, eg., Jere W. Morehead, When a Peremptory Challenge Is No Longer Peremp-
tory: Batson's Unfortunate Failure to Eradicate Invidious Discrimination From Jury Selec-
tion. 43 DEPAUL L. Rnv. 625 (1994).
182. See Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the
Selection of Impartial Juries?, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 703, 726 (1991) (proposing that "filury
selection procedures should limit attorney participation to modest levels and reduce or
eliminate the institution of peremptory challenges"); see also Abraham Abramovsky &
Jonathan I. Edeltein, Cameras In the Jury Room: An Unnecessary and Dangerous Prece-
dent, 28 Amz. ST. L.J. 865, 880 (1996) (listing the reduction or elimination of peremptory
challenges as one of the jury system reform suggestions voiced in the "aftermath of...
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It is essential to the integrity of the justice system that peremp-
tory challenges be preserved since the selection of "an impartial jury is
one of the most important aspects of any . . . trial.' 183 The multi-
factor approach outlined in Part III allows for both the elimination of
discrimination from jury selection and the preservation of peremptory
challenges.
high-profile trials") (citing Dissatisfaction With the Jury System Is Growing, and More Re-
form Is Expected, NAt'L L.J., Dec. 25, 1995, at C12).
183. Fahringer, supra note 31, at 412.

